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A Tale of Two Regulators: Antitrust 
Implications of Progressive 




Competition regulators have identified the potential for 
blockchain technology to disrupt traditional sponsor-led 
platforms, like app stores, that have received increased antitrust 
scrutiny. Enforcement actions by securities regulators, however, 
have forced blockchain-based platforms to adopt a strategy of 
progressive decentralization, delaying decentralization 
objectives in favor of the centralized model that competition 
regulators hope they will disrupt. This regulatory tension, and 
the implications for blockchain’s procompetitive potential, have 
yet to be explored. This Article first identifies the origin of this 
tension and its consequences through a competition law lens, and 
then recommends that competition regulators account for this 
tension in monitoring the blockchain industry and strive to 
resolve it moving forward. 
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 I.  Introduction 
Competition regulators around the world have recognized 
the procompetitive potential of permissionless, decentralized 
blockchain-based platforms.1 In particular, blockchain 
technology has the ability to limit or eliminate the role of the 
central intermediary or sponsor in a multi-sided platform, 
which competition regulators hope will mitigate the risk of one 
company securing market power.2 For example, unlike 
traditional platforms where one party controls user data and 
platform rules, including platform access, decentralized 
blockchain-based platforms typically open network data and 
 
 1. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Never 
Break the Chain: Pursuing Antifragility in Antitrust Enforcement, Remarks 
at the Thirteenth Annual Conference on Innovation Economics (Aug. 27, 
2020), https://perma.cc/U3TE-267K; CHRIS PIKE, OECD, ISSUES PAPER BY THE 
SECRETARIAT NO. 47, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND COMPETITION POLICY 7 
(2018), https://perma.cc/5Y5L-EBXM (PDF). 
 2. See Delrahim, supra note 1 (“The potential of blockchain is the ability 
to operate a marketplace or network without a centralized 
intermediary. . . . [A] central question for antitrust enforcers [is]: whether this 
new way of organizing interactions can prevent or limit the concentration of 
market power.”); Christian Catalini & Catherine Tucker, Antitrust and 
Costless Verification: An Optimistic and a Pessimistic View of the Implications 
of Blockchain Technology (MIT Sloan Sch. Working Paper No. 5523-18, 2018). 
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governance to all platform participants.3 Accordingly, 
competition regulators consider decentralized platforms as a 
potential alternative to sponsor-led platforms that many have 
recently challenged for allegedly violating antitrust laws.4 
Enforcement actions from other regulators, however, are 
pushing blockchain-based platforms away from the ideals of 
decentralization and toward the centralized, sponsor-led model 
that competition regulators hope they will disrupt. In 
particular, enforcement actions against Initial Coin Offerings 
(ICOs)—a key mechanism to incentivize participation in an 
open and decentralized network—have complicated the 
procompetitive vision for blockchain platforms.  
This Article begins with a brief primer on blockchain 
platforms. It continues by describing the incentives problem 
that blockchain platforms face, the role that ICOs play in 
solving that problem, and the response from the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). This Article then identifies a 
consequence of the SEC’s enforcement actions against ICOs: 
that companies must adopt a platform-sponsor role at the outset 
and gradually march toward decentralization over time—a 
business strategy called progressive decentralization. Next, it 
discusses the antitrust implications of progressive 
decentralization and the ICO enforcement actions that led to it. 
This Article concludes with recommendations for regulators and 
policymakers. 
 
 3. These are just a handful of typical sponsor functions, but they are the 
ones that generally result in complaints from platform participants and 
competitors, and that as a result drive antitrust scrutiny. Other typical 
sponsor roles, such as steering platform development, marketing, and 
lobbying for preferred legal treatment, are performed in the blockchain context 
by non-profit foundations (e.g., Ethereum Foundation), which are typically 
composed of a platform’s founding group of developers, who can influence but 
not control a decentralized platform, and industry association groups (e.g., The 
Blockchain Association). 
 4. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief at 3, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-cv-03590 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020) 
(accusing Facebook of “anticompetitive conditioning of access to its platform 
to suppress competition”). 
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II.  Primer on Blockchain Platforms 
In general terms, a “blockchain” is a decentralized, 
distributed ledger that maintains an immutable record of 
transactions. Each transaction or series of transactions is a 
block in the chain. Banking offers some clear examples that help 
distinguish blockchain networks from traditional networks. 
Traditional networks require users to trust that a central 
intermediary will accurately confirm and execute valid 
transactions. For example, banking customers rely on their 
banks for access to their funds, to accurately record and relay 
the balance of their account, and to execute valid transactions, 
such as the exchange of funds, between parties. In blockchain 
networks, however, transaction records are duplicated, 
distributed, and verified across a network of individual 
computers or “validators,” eliminating the need for trust in a 
central intermediary. To use a variation on the banking example 
from above, in a blockchain network where two users are trying 
to exchange a digital asset, a user does not need to trust that 
any one party will confirm ownership of that digital asset and 
execute transfer of that ownership from one party to the other. 
Instead, the provenance of that digital asset is simultaneously 
confirmed by all of the individual computers on the blockchain, 
each of which holds a copy of the blockchain’s ledger. Upon the 
transaction’s completion, an updated ledger is duplicated and 
distributed to the validators on the network. Blockchain 
networks often reward validators with digital assets known as 
tokens. 
A “blockchain-based platform” is a platform built using the 
above-described distributed ledger technology upon which 
developers can write and host applications. Simplified, a 
blockchain-based platform has two layers, the protocol layer and 
the application layer. The blockchain protocol establishes the 
rules by which the network is governed and transactions are 
validated.5 Protocols designed to support applications 
incorporate an application programming interface that allows 
 
 5. The process for validating transactions, known as a “consensus 
mechanism,” varies by protocol. One example is proof-of-stake, where 
validators agree to tie-up some of their tokens to vie for a chance to validate a 
transaction and mint the next block in the chain, for which they receive a 
token reward. 
ANTITRUST & BLOCKCHAIN  391 
 
developers to access and transmit data to and from the 
blockchain. Ethereum, for example, allows developers to write 
“smart contracts,” a coded script that is embedded into the 
Ethereum blockchain and sets out rules for governing a specific 
transaction. Developers can then build applications that 
interact with these smart contracts. 
What makes blockchain platforms unique and potentially 
disruptive to existing networks is that a central authority does 
not control the rules governing the protocol and its applications. 
Smart contracts, for example, are autonomous and 
self-executing—their terms cannot be changed, even by the 
contract’s creator. Additionally, changes to protocol rules 
typically require approval from platform participants—one 
party is unable to unilaterally change the rules of the platform, 
which is a common criticism of sponsor-led platforms, like app 
stores. 
III.  Blockchain’s Incentives Problem 
For all of its procompetitive potential, the concept of a 
decentralized, permissionless, and open-source blockchain 
protocol faces a significant incentives problem, or what at least 
one investor has called a “value capture paradox.”6 Blockchain 
networks are multi-sided platforms that need to attract a 
diverse set of participants to succeed, including investors, 
validators, developers, and end users. A fundamental 
characteristic of a decentralized platform is that the network’s 
source code, as well as its data, is publicly available. This means 
that any developer can create and implement a copy or “fork” of 
an open-source protocol. Developers could even take a fee-based 
protocol and duplicate it, while reducing the fee or eliminating 
it altogether. Put another way, a permissionless, decentralized, 
and open-source network is completely undefended from 
free-riding. Intellectual property and trade secret protections 
(e.g., using resources such as data in a proprietary way) that 
typically protect platforms and that allow its participants to 
generate income are absent from open and decentralized 
blockchain networks. If investors, validators, and developers 
 
 6. TechCrunch, Ali Yahya: Crypto Business Models, YOUTUBE (May 27, 
2020), https://perma.cc/9MCE-M3AS.  
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are less able to capture value, then there is less incentive to 
participate in the network.  
To solve the incentives problem, blockchain platforms must 
implement a mechanism that allows participants to capture 
value from the network. Without solving the incentives problem, 
it is unlikely that a blockchain platform will achieve the 
disruptive competitive potential that regulators often tout.7 
A.  ICOs as a Solution to Blockchain’s Incentive Problem 
Raising funds through the issuance of digital assets, often 
as an ICO, was the blockchain community’s early response to its 
incentives problem. ICOs serve a dual purpose. First, they allow 
developers to raise capital on the front end of a project by 
pre-selling access to their platform in the form of tokens. 
According to CoinDesk’s ICO Tracker, ICOs raised $256 million 
in 2016, $5.5 billion in 2017, and $13.6 billion in the first half of 
2020.8 Second, tokens build strong network effects through a 
feedback loop. A blockchain’s token draws the attention of early 
investors and developers.9 These early investors and developers 
build products and services on the blockchain in an effort to 
cause the success of the project and increase the value of their 
tokens. The success of the project brings more users to the 
blockchain, who share in the value appreciation of the network, 
which drives more investors and developers to participate, each 
with an aligned incentive to develop and build upon the 
blockchain to drive up the value of their tokens. In its most 
simple form, the token feedback loop can be described as: 
investment leads to development, development leads to user 
 
 7. As former Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim explained, 
“[t]he benefit of blockchain is that it may be able to eliminate, or shift the role 
of, intermediaries. The drawback in the system is that individual participants 
might lack the proper incentives to invest in creating the network in the first 
instance or in maintaining it over time.” Delrahim, supra note 1. 
 8. CoinDesk ICO Tracker, COINDESK, https://perma.cc/PUY4-ZKZ7.  
 9. See Christian Fisch, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) to Finance New 
Ventures, 34 J. BUS. VENTURING 1, 5 (2019) (“ICOs typically occur in the early 
stages of a venture’s life cycle and the tokens often do not have any counter 
value or real-world usage at the time of the ICO.” (citations omitted)). 
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adoption, user adoption leads to value, and value leads to 
investment, and over again.10 
An ICO does not necessarily guarantee a functioning 
feedback loop, however. Instead of attracting active participants 
to the platform, ICOs may attract speculators who only intend 
to trade the token on crypto exchanges.11 Investors are an 
important part of the feedback loop, and asset liquidity an 
important part of value capture, but a large imbalance between 
speculators and active platform participants (e.g., users, 
developers, and validators) risks the integrity of the platform. 
B.  Regulatory Response to ICOs 
During the 2017 ICO boom12 and the period that followed, 
the regulatory landscape was relatively uncertain as the SEC 
struggled to provide clarity to blockchain startups regarding 
this nascent form of fundraising and platform building.13 Fast 
 
 10. See Lin William Cong, Ye Li & Neng Wang, Tokenomics: Dynamic 
Adoption and Valuation E-2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 
27222, 2020) (“[A] greater user base attracts more resources and research onto 
the platform, accelerating the technological progress on the platform and 
creating a positive feedback loop.”). 
 11. See Sabrina T. Howell, Marina Niessner & David Yermack, Initial 
Coin Offerings: Financing Growth with Cryptocurrency Token Sales 21 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 24774, 2019) (“[C]onventional 
institutional investors such as hedge funds and VCs have purchased 
significant shares of tokens, especially in the most sought-after ICOs, raising 
concerns that utility tokens are held mostly be speculators rather than future 
customers.”). 
 12. See Nareg Essaghoolian, Comment, Initial Coin Offerings: Emerging 
Technology’s Fundraising Innovation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 294, 312–13 (2019) 
(“[I]t was not until 2016 that ICOs boomed in popularity. . . . In 2017, there 
was an exponential increase in the number of ICOs held and the amounts 
raised.”). 
 13. In July 2017, the SEC published an investigative report concluding 
that DAO Tokens were securities and cautioned market participants that: 
[T]he federal securities laws apply to those who offer and sell 
securities in the United States, regardless whether the issuing 
entity is a traditional company or a decentralized autonomous 
organization, regardless whether those securities are purchased 
using U.S. dollars or virtual currencies, and regardless whether 
they are distributed in certificated form or through distributed 
ledger technology.  
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forward to 2020 and the SEC Enforcement Division’s record 
year in disgorgements and penalties totaling $4.68 billion, more 
than a quarter of which came from unregistered ICOs.14 During 
this time, the SEC relied on enforcement actions over 
rulemaking to regulate blockchain-based platforms.15 These 
enforcement actions are driving blockchain-based companies in 
the United States16 to adopt a more traditional fundraising 
model, and to ease into decentralization. 
The SEC published a “Framework for ‘Investment Contract’ 
Analysis of Digital Assets” in April 201917 that used the Howey 
Test, derived from SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,18 to determine 
whether a specific token or coin constitutes an “investment 
contract” that is subject to securities regulations. The first prong 
of the Howey Test is “the investment of money,”19 which the SEC 
explains is “typically satisfied in an offer and sale of a digital 
 
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Investigative Report 
Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were Securities (July 25, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/QJ95-7DAK. The SEC made clear that the DAO Report was 
intended to put the industry on notice, but acknowledged that whether a 
digital asset was a security would depend on an individualized assessment of 
“particular facts and circumstances.” Report of Investigation Pursuant to 
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act 
Release No. 81207, 2017 SEC LEXIS 2194 (July 25, 2017), https://perma.cc
/3WC4-HTMY (PDF).  
 14. Joshua Mapperson, The SEC Collected $1.26 Billion from 
Unregistered ICOs in 2020, COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc
/E47B-R65V.  
 15. See Marco Dell-Erba, From Inactivity to Full Enforcement: The 
Implementation of the “Do No Harm” Approach in Initial Coin Offerings, 26 
MICH. TECH. L. REV. 175, 194–203 (2020) (discussing the transition from 
relative inaction on the part of the SEC and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission to a state of full enforcement of existing, rather than new, 
securities laws as they apply to ICOs). 
 16. Although this Article focuses on the regulatory treatment of ICOs in 
the United States, blockchain-based startups may face similar issues in 
countries with comparable securities laws. For an overview of ICO regulatory 
treatment in foreign jurisdictions, see L. BUS. RSCH., GETTING THE DEAL 
THROUGH: FINTECH (Penny Miller & Angus McLean eds., 2018), LEXIS 
(database updated 2021). 
 17. STRATEGIC HUB FOR INNOVATION AND FIN. TECH., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL 
ASSETS (2019) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL ASSETS], https://perma.cc
/98Q5-65F6.  
 18. 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
 19. Id. at 301. 
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asset because the digital asset is purchased or otherwise 
acquired in exchange for value, whether in the form of real (or 
fiat) currency, another digital asset, or other type of 
consideration.”20 The second prong is “common enterprise,”21 
which the SEC also typically finds that digital assets satisfy 
because “the fortunes of digital asset purchasers have been 
linked to each other or to the success of the promoter’s efforts.”22 
The third prong of the Howey Test is “reasonable expectation of 
profits to be derived from the . . . efforts of others,”23 which the 
SEC identifies as usually “the main issue in analyzing a digital 
asset . . . .”24 The SEC further explains that “[w]hen a promoter, 
sponsor, or other third party . . . provides essential managerial 
efforts that affect the success of the enterprise, and investors 
reasonably expect to derive profit from those efforts, then [the 
third prong] is met.”25  
The SEC’s concern is that if an investment is dependent on 
a third party, information about that third party is necessary to 
make an informed investment decision, and without a 
regulatory framework that requires disclosure of that 
information, uninformed investors are at risk. In the context of 
digital assets, this inquiry boils down to whether the platform 
is decentralized. For example, the SEC in 2018 clarified that 
Bitcoin and Ether—the token that powers the Ethereum 
network—are not securities because the underlying networks 
are sufficiently decentralized such that investors are not reliant 
on any one third party. The SEC has not explained at what point 
Bitcoin and Ethereum reached sufficient decentralization, and 
if early investments in Ethereum prior to such sufficient 
decentralization could be construed as securities.  
The SEC and the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Antitrust 
Division entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
in June 2020 “to foster cooperation and communication between 
the agencies with the aim of enhancing competition in the 
 
 20. FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL ASSETS, supra note 17. 
 21. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298–301.  
 22. FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL ASSETS, supra note 17 (citing Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n v. Int’l Loan Network, Inc., 968 F.2d 1304, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
 23. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). 
 24. FRAMEWORK FOR DIGITAL ASSETS, supra note 17. 
 25. Id. 
396 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 387 (2021) 
 
securities industry.”26 Despite this working relationship, the 
SEC’s legal framework for cryptocurrencies puts the cart before 
the horse from a go-to-market perspective, which has 
implications for competition law priorities. How can a network 
reach sufficient decentralization without incentivizing third 
parties to develop, maintain and innovate on that network with 
tokens? SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce echoed this concern, 
asking “[h]ow can a token network ever get off the ground if 
every token distribution event is viewed as a securities 
offering?”27 
IV.  Antitrust Implications of Progressive Decentralization as 
Response to ICO Enforcement 
The SEC’s enforcement actions against ICOs have steered 
blockchain-based startups away from ICOs and toward a 
business strategy based on “progressive decentralization.”28 
Progressive decentralization is a go-to-market strategy that 
frontloads product and community development before 
decentralization objectives.29 Generally, the progressive 
decentralization roadmap is divided into three sequential 
stages. First, a core team of developers design an attractive 
 
 26. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Justice Department’s Antitrust Division Sign Historic 
Memorandum of Understanding (June 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/NE8E-
DN9Q.  
 27. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Not Braking 
and Breaking, Remarks Before the Blockchain Week Event (July 21, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/L4D2-5X38.  
 28. See Jesse Walden, Progressive Decentralization: A Playbook for 
Building Crypto Applications, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (Jan. 9, 2020), https://
perma.cc/MG95-5QN3 (describing progressive decentralization as “a process 
in which founding teams relinquish control by degrees, over 
time. . . . allow[ing] teams to focus and create a path toward regulatory 
compliance, including issuing tokens that hopefully will not run afoul of 
securities regulations”). 
 29. See id. (“If you’re a crypto founder and are ready for 
[decentralization], that means you have achieved early product/market fit, 
built a robust community capable of successfully maintaining the application, 
and mapped out a model that properly incentivizes sustainable operations.”). 
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product or service.30 Second, that core team begins to build a 
community of developers and users for that product or service 
(i.e., building network effects).31 Third, and finally, the core 
team gives ownership of the product or service to the 
community, typically through a token distribution that, among 
other things, enables holders to participate in platform 
governance.32 
The deal structure for startups embracing progressive 
decentralization is similar to that of traditional startups. 
Instead of crowdfunding through an ICO, startups pursue seed 
funding from venture capital in exchange for equity in the 
company and a right to receive a share of tokens proportionate 
to its initial investment if a distribution event occurs.33 When it 
comes time to transfer ownership to the community, a 
percentage of tokens is allocated to investors on a pro rata basis 
relative to the total tokens allocated to the founders, with both 
shares diluted, potentially significantly so, to accommodate 
distribution to the public.34 This deal structure is a testament to 
the value created by a token feedback loop. Investors in 
traditional startups accept dilution of their equity share during 
subsequent rounds of investments because, in theory, an influx 
of capital leads to increased production and a higher rate of 
return. Similarly, investors accept dilution of their ownership in 
 
 30. See id. (“The earliest stage of building a crypto application requires 
all the ingredients of a normal startup: a great team, lean development, tight 
execution, and quick learning. During this phase, the only thing that matters 
is product/market fit.”). 
 31. See id. (“[F]ounders might invest more heavily in best practices for 
running the product like an open source project: invest in good documentation; 
develop openly; offer bounties, grants or other incentives for third-party 
development; hire community leaders to help steward open development; and 
introduce rough consensus on decision making.” (citation omitted)). 
 32. See id. (“The spirit of this objective is to mark a specific moment 
where a crypto product company completes its journey from traditional 
product team to sustainable community-owned-and-operated network.”). 
 33. Jamie Goldstein, Token Equity Convertible (TEC)—a New Way to 
Invest in Crypto Companies, PILLAR VC (Dec. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/B6JK-
B5UT.  
 34. For example, if a venture capital firm invests $1 million for 20 percent 
equity in the company and a distribution event occurs in which 70 percent of 
all tokens are distributed to the public, then the venture capital firm would 
receive 20 percent of the remaining tokens (6 percent), leaving 24 percent for 
the founders. 
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a blockchain startup through token distribution because of the 
increased value that the token feedback loop creates. 
Progressive decentralization offers certain strategic 
benefits that may be missing from an ICO-first approach. 
Progressive decentralization solves for one of the major 
inefficiencies associated with an ICO: that, as described above, 
a substantial portion of ICO purchasers may be speculators that 
are unlikely to actively participate in the development of a 
platform. It also prevents companies from launching a product 
too early, before the core team develops the right product fit that 
will spur adoption of the technology, one of the biggest hurdles 
of general consumer use cases for blockchain. As venture 
capitalist Nick Grossman explained during a DOJ workshop on 
“Venture Capital and Antitrust,” “in the crypto land, you’ve got 
things that are public and they’re like seed stage products.”35 
From a regulatory-risk perspective, it provides an opportunity 
to try to reach sufficient decentralization prior to issuing a 
digital asset, mitigating the risk that a token or coin issuance 
will run afoul of securities laws.  
With that said, progressive decentralization does swing the 
pendulum back toward sponsor-led platforms (at least at the 
outset) and requires trust that the platform sponsor will, in fact, 
follow through on its commitments to decentralize. Additionally, 
the regulatory pitfalls facing ICOs still exist as companies try to 
execute the third and final stage of a progressive 
decentralization roadmap: giving ownership to the community. 
This Part unpacks the antitrust implications of progressive 
decentralization. 
A.  Libra and Early Reactions to Progressive Decentralization 
Reactions to Libra, a blockchain-based global payments 
system conceived by Facebook and which endorsed progressive 
decentralization principles since its inception, provide some 
insight into how competition regulators may respond to this 
model. Libra adopted a centralized model early to address 
technical and regulatory concerns surrounding a fully 
 
 35. Nick Grossman, Partner, Union Square Ventures, Remarks at 
Venture Capital and Antitrust, Public Workshop Held by the Antitrust 
Division of the United States Department of Justice 74 (Feb. 12, 2020) 
(transcript available at https://perma.cc/3ERM-BN3J (PDF)).  
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permissionless payments network.36 The Libra 
Association — made up of Facebook and a set group of other 
companies, including Visa, Mastercard, eBay, Uber, Lyft, and 
Spotify37—would manage Libra and vote on policy decisions. 
Importantly, the users holding Libra would have no say in 
governance. Although the Libra blockchain is intended to work 
independently of Facebook, many suspected that given the 
important role that Libra’s integration with Facebook’s existing 
services will play in driving its adoption,38 Facebook had 
significant influence over the other association members.39  
Right away, this model drew criticism from industry 
observers.40 Ethereum Co-Founder Joe Lubin called Libra “a 
centralized wolf in a decentralized sheep’s clothing.”41 
Competition regulators also reacted with skepticism, honing in 
on the ability of the Libra Association’s large, incumbent firms 
to exclude competitors. For example, the European Commission 
(EC) started investigating “potential anti-competitive behavior” 
related to the Libra Association just two months after its launch 
due to reported concerns that “the proposed payment system 
 
 36. See infra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 37. Visa, Mastercard, and eBay, among others, left the Libra Association 
following regulatory scrutiny of the project. Corinne Reichert & Andrew 
Morse, Facebook’s Libra Cryptocurrency Loses Support of Five Founding 
Members, CNET (Oct. 14, 2020, 1:30 PM), https://perma.cc/Z7G5-2DGV.   
 38. Enrique Dans, Libra: An Interesting Idea, If Only Facebook Weren’t 
Involved, FORBES (June 20, 2019, 3:44 AM), https://perma.cc/2UFA-2WRX 
(“[W]hen the currency comes into circulation, the vast majority of its users will 
likely come from the user base of Facebook itself, along with Facebook 
Messenger and WhatsApp, which will integrate Calibra and allow Facebook 
to monetize the flotation of those funds.”). 
 39. Clare Duffy, Facebook Says Libra Is Out of Its Control. But Libra’s 
Overseers Are a Web of Silicon Valley Insiders, CNN (Sept. 29, 2019, 5:41 PM), 
https://perma.cc/MH4S-U9X8.  
 40. Rony Roy, Is Libra Decentralized? Maybe Not, COINBEAT (July 31, 
2019), https://perma.cc/YT4P-4UPX 
Once again this is a monopoly of the wealthy where the technology 
that was supposed to free us from the system ends up giving control 
to a bunch of corporations that are hiding behind the mask of 
decentralization but is, in fact, more centralized than what we can 
think of. 
 41. Joe Lubin, Facebook’s Cryptocurrency Is a Centralized Wolf in 
Decentralized Sheep’s Clothing, QUARTZ (June 21, 2019), https://perma.cc
/J9GL-RE2W.  
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would unfairly shut out rivals.”42 Specifically, the EC said that 
it was concerned about how the Libra Association may create 
“possible competition restrictions” on the information that will 
be exchanged on the Libra blockchain and the use of Libra 
consumer data.43 
The original Libra white paper explained that “an 
important objective of the Libra Association is to move toward 
increasing decentralization over time,” promising to start the 
transition toward “permissionless governance and consensus on 
the Libra network” within five years of Libra’s public launch.44 
The lack of detail in Libra’s decentralization roadmap did little 
to instill confidence. Thibault Schrepel, a blockchain antitrust 
scholar, raised concerns that Libra’s commitment to move to a 
permissionless platform was vague and may never come to 
fruition.45 Schrepel noted that the Libra white paper made clear 
that decentralization was dependent on the development of a 
“proven solution that can deliver the scale, stability, and 
security needed to support billions of people and transactions 
across the globe through a permissionless network,” which may 
never occur.46 It also gave the Libra Association a great deal of 
discretion over whether any technological solution is sufficient 
for Libra’s purposes. The only public-facing and objective 
criteria for decentralization was the outside time limit of five 
years from the date of public launch to start to decentralize. As 
Lubin explains, Facebook and the rest of the Libra Association 
“requires our trust that Libra will eventually transition to a 
more ‘permissionless,’ decentralized system, whereby anyone 
can validate the network, rather than the restrictive member 
evaluation criteria keeping control in the hands of the initial 28 
 
 42. Lydia Beyoud & Aoife White, Facebook’s Libra Currency Gets 
European Union Antitrust Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 20, 2019, 12:41 PM), 
https://perma.cc/W22P-D735. 
 43. Id.  
 44. LIBRA ASS’N MEMBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LIBRA 9 (2019) 
[hereinafter Libra White Paper], https://perma.cc/WJ84-K8DY (PDF).  
 45. See Thibault Schrepel, Libra: A Concentrate of “Blockchain 
Antitrust”, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 160, 163 (2020) (“[T]he change in 
governance may never come. One may wonder if such a vague strategy is best 
for Facebook, considering the distrust surrounding the company.”). 
 46. Libra White Paper, supra note 44, at 4; see Schrepel, supra note 45, 
at 162–63. 
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firms.”47 Lubin’s comments highlight the dichotomy between 
Libra and the trustless architecture that is typical of blockchain 
networks. 
Employees of Novi, a Facebook subsidiary and Libra 
Association member charged with building a Libra-based wallet 
with WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger integrations, outlined 
the “questions, decisions, and challenges the Libra Association 
will face on the journey to permissionless governance and 
consensus.”48 They acknowledge that “centralized control” and 
the ability of platform architects (like Facebook) to “change the 
rules of protocol to their advantage after others have joined” is 
an area of concern.49 The Libra Association addresses this 
concern, they argue, because it is “an independent, not-for-profit 
entity that no single Founding Member can control,” requiring 
participation by a majority of Libra Association members to 
make any decision.50 
Novi employees say that Libra made “irreversible 
commitments” to achieve the progressive opening of 
participation in the Libra network, including establishing 
certain criteria for membership decisions as the Libra 
Association expands.51  
As the technology matures, the Libra Blockchain will 
transition from relying on the votes based on association 
membership—in order to operate validator nodes and vote 
on governance—to relying on ownership of Libra coins. The 
basic intuition is that at scale the network should be owned 
by its users and should always evolve in a way to protect 
their interests and assets.52 
This Article’s focus is on the impact that securities 
enforcement actions have had on the procompetitive potential of 
blockchain platforms through a competition law lens, but other 
regulatory actions have consequences as well. Questions from 
financial regulators forced Libra, which is now called “Diem,” to 
 
 47. Lubin, supra note 41. 
 48. SHEHAR BANO ET AL., CALIBRA, MOVING TOWARD PERMISSIONLESS 
CONSENSUS 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/3V2Y-RADZ (PDF).  
 49. Id. at 2. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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abandon its plan to progressively decentralize to a 
permissionless network altogether.53 Specifically, financial 
regulators questioned how Libra could preserve compliance 
measures to prevent misuse (e.g., money laundering) after it 
transitioned to a permissionless system.54 Instead, Diem 
pledged to “replicate the key economic properties of a 
permissionless system through an open, transparent, and 
competitive market for network services and governance . . . .”55 
B.  Progressive Decentralization Requires Trust That Platform 
Sponsors Will Actually Decentralize 
Decentralization is the linchpin of the procompetitive 
potential for blockchain-based platforms, as envisioned by 
competition regulators. Indeed, Nick Grossman captured the 
sentiment of many competition regulators when he explained 
that people are worried about sponsor-led platforms like app 
stores where they could be “cut off,” which is why his venture 
capital firm is “so excited about the crypto and blockchain space 
because that is one area where the platform is an open, 
unowned, uncontrolled platform.”56 From Libra’s example, it is 
clear that an unspecified path to decentralization is insufficient 
to quell the concerns that industry observers and regulators 
share regarding sponsor-led platforms in the blockchain space. 
Interestingly, there are a handful of mechanisms (some unique 
to blockchain) that may help companies address concerns 
regarding their commitment to decentralization. 
Arthur Camara, one of the founders of CryptoKitties, a 
blockchain-based game, describes a scenario in which a game is 
run on a smart contract that implements ascending levels of 
 
 53. White Paper v2.0, DIEM (2020) [hereinafter Diem White Paper], 
https://perma.cc/9CTM-WR5U.  
 54. See Tom Wilson, Global Money-Laundering Watchdog Closely 
Monitoring Facebook’s Libra, Official Says, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2019, 3:05 PM) 
(“[T]he volume and speed of cryptocurrency transactions presents a growing 
challenge in pinpointing illegal use, even as technology to identify such actions 
is developed.”). 
 55. Diem White Paper, supra note 53. 
 56. Grossman, supra note 35, at 66–67. 
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decentralization.57 The first level allows the contract owners to 
modify gameplay, the second level revokes their ability to 
modify gameplay but preserves certain other special privileges, 
and the third level revokes all special privileges assigned to the 
original contract owner.58 This means that the game would be 
fully autonomous, self-executing based on the smart contract’s 
terms without external influence from any party, including the 
creators.59 Camara suggests that creators can hold themselves 
accountable to their progressive decentralization roadmap by 
implementing time- or block-based maturity, where the smart 
contract described above ascends levels after a predefined 
period of time, or at the point that the blockchain passes a 
certain block number.60 Founders can also create an economic 
incentive to decentralize, where the portion of the fee for using 
the service that the founders retain, or the fee itself, increases 
with each level of decentralization.61 Competition regulators 
appear open to using smart contracts to effectuate behavioral 
remedies in competition cases, so implementing progressive 
decentralization through smart contracts might be compelling.62 
Companies can take other steps to instill confidence within 
their community that they will follow through on 
decentralization. For example, blockchain-based startup 
Compound eliminated the ability for its creators to make sudden 
 
 57. Arthur Camara, Dieter Shirley & Grady Mitchell, Why Progressive 
Decentralization Is Blockchain’s Best Hope, FREECODECAMP (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/A8TY-K6BZ. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (“[P]rogressive decentralization advocates easing into 
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is building mechanisms into smart contracts that confer special powers to the 
creators up front, then incrementally lock those powers away in a transparent 
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 62. See PIKE, supra note 1, at 9 (“Depending on the nature of the 
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404 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 387 (2021) 
 
changes to the platform’s rules, implementing a 48-hour waiting 
period or “time lock” before changes take effect.63 Compound, a 
proponent of progressive decentralization, plans to test, in a 
transparent way, on-chain governance mechanisms that allow 
the community, instead of the core team, to govern the 
platform.64 
There is not one right way to implement a progressive 
decentralization strategy, and only time will tell how embracing 
a clear roadmap to community ownership and taking consistent 
action in line with that goal—such as publishing high-quality, 
open-source developer materials—may reduce the risk of 
antitrust scrutiny associated with sponsor-led platforms. 
C.  The Current Enforcement Environment May Deter 
Leveraging Existing Ecosystems 
Even for companies that forgo ICOs at the product 
development stage, issuing a token is an integral part of 
reaching the final stage of progressive 
decentralization — community ownership—and companies must 
still consider whether that token constitutes a security. As 
explained in greater detail above, the third prong of the Howey 
Test focuses on investors’ expectations that they will derive 
profit based on the work of others.65 The SEC’s application of 
this prong to date complicates the path for blockchain-based 
platforms that wish to leverage existing ecosystems to spur 
adoption. In particular, the SEC brought two of its 
highest-profile ICO enforcement actions against messaging app 
providers, and a significant factor in each case was the 
“inextricable” connection between the token and the platform 
sponsor’s messaging app.   
In SEC v. Telegram Group, Inc.,66 the SEC argued that 
Grams, the token at issue, satisfied the second and third prongs 
of the Howey Test because “investors expect[ed] to profit from 
 
 63. TechCrunch, Robert Leshner and Jesse Walden: Deep Dive on 
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 65. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 66. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19-CV-9439, 2020 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106592 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2020). 
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Telegram’s work,” in part due to “integration with Messenger.”67 
The SEC explained that “Telegram emphasized to 
investors . . . that Messenger . . . w[as] integral to the success of 
the TON blockchain and Grams,”68 including in its initial 
offering documents, which stated that “[i]ntegrated into 
Telegram’s applications, the TON Wallet should become the 
world’s most adopted cryptocurrency wallet.”69 Telegram 
indicated that it would “leverage its existing ecosystem of 
communities, developers, publishers, payment providers, and 
merchants to drive demand and value for [Grams]”70 and that 
based on the “number of existing Messenger users, Grams would 
be accessible in 170 million wallets,” more than Bitcoin and 
Ethereum, the two largest cryptocurrencies by market 
capitalization.71 Telegram also planned to “airdrop” 250 million 
Grams to Messenger users following the launch of the TON 
blockchain.72  
In SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc.,73 the SEC argued that “Kik 
promised to start by integrating Kin into Kik Messenger ‘to 
really give it value.’”74 Kik’s CEO purportedly explained at a 
2017 conference that “we’re setting 30 percent of Kin aside for 
Kik, as a financial incentive for us basically to put this huge 
messenger into this ecosystem, and to get this whole ecosystem 
going.”75 Kik’s white paper stated that Kik would “leverage its 
large existing user base to drive mass adoption” of Kin, and that 
“Kik will build fundamental value for the new currency by 
integrating Kin into its chat app.”76 Kik explained that it would 
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integrate digital wallets for each Kik Messenger account to 
enable “common wallet interactions,” and would explore 
changes to Kik that would support Kik users buying and selling 
goods using Kin.77 
It is unclear at what point—if at all—a decentralized 
network leveraging an existing sponsor-led ecosystem or service 
can safely issue a token without violating securities laws. This 
is problematic for blockchain advocates who believe that 
integration with existing products is the only way to achieve 
mass adoption in the near future and for competition regulators, 
because adoption is the only way for these platforms to compete. 
In addition to securities laws, companies must consider 
whether a business strategy to leverage an existing ecosystem 
gives rise to antitrust claims on abuse of dominance grounds. 
There has been a recent uptick in dominance investigations into 
messaging services integrating digital payment services.78 
Competition regulators may raise similar concerns about the 
integration of token economies and wallets with messaging 
platforms or other services.  
D.  Progressive Decentralization May Lead to Consolidation 
Competition regulators pay close attention to incumbent 
firms eliminating competitive threats through acquisition, and 
that is especially true for new and potentially disruptive 
technologies.79 Facing public scrutiny for allowing digital 
platforms to acquire nascent competitors, competition 
regulators are likely to be especially protective of blockchain as 
an innovative and potentially disruptive technology. Securities 
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enforcement actions that have steered companies toward 
progressive decentralization may have made that mission more 
difficult. Progressive decentralization increases the likelihood 
that a new blockchain startup—or an existing company that is 
integrating blockchain in an attempt to differentiate its product 
or platform from competitors—will be strategically acquired by 
an incumbent firm because it attracts private investors that 
may prefer an M&A exit strategy over an ICO. As venture 
capital firm Kesha Ventures explains, after the increase in 
regulatory enforcement against ICOs, “[m]any new blockchain 
focused companies . . . are choosing to stay private for much 
longer . . . or ICO/list only in a much later stage, maintaining 
M&A as a viable exit option.”80 For companies that may not be 
able to secure private investment in the first place, and for 
which legally conducting an ICO is too difficult, they may have 
to leave the market altogether. This reduces competition. 
Kik, for example, turned to an ICO after it was unable to 
find a buyer for the business. According to the SEC’s complaint, 
Kik hired an investment bank to orchestrate a sale process. 
Seven buyers expressed interest in Kik but ultimately declined 
to buy the company.81 Kik’s CEO stated that engaging in an ICO 
was a necessity because “[Kik] cannot compete with 
Facebook.”82 In response to the SEC’s complaint, Kik explained 
that its costs exceeded revenues “as a result of struggling to 
compete with larger social media companies, who have a 
dominant share of the market for advertising within mobile 
applications.”83 Kik ultimately shut down its messaging app 
during the pendency of the SEC litigation in an effort to divert 
resources to its legal defense.84 
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V.  Recommendations 
Blockchain technology and its use cases are still developing, 
and so too is the regulatory response to blockchain-based 
platforms. This Article proposes two recommendations for 
consideration in light of the apparent tension between the 
priorities for securities regulators on the one hand and 
competition regulators on the other. 
First, competition regulators should consider the current 
regulatory dynamics that are shaping the blockchain market 
when considering whether to investigate conduct or initiate an 
enforcement action. For example, competition regulators should 
realize that the current regulatory environment may force a 
company to delay decentralization and instead adopt a 
sponsor-led model. This could take a handful of forms, including 
an association of companies that control the platform in its early 
days. Competition regulators should carefully consider a 
project’s progressive decentralization roadmap, and the 
mechanisms in place to ensure decentralization is achieved, 
before reacting negatively to the involvement of an incumbent 
firm in a blockchain project or other sponsor-led platform 
dynamics. Additionally, competition regulators should 
thoughtfully consider whether leveraging an existing ecosystem 
(e.g., a messaging app) will actually lead to de facto control over 
the blockchain platform, or if such product integration is merely 
one step in the progressive decentralization roadmap. 
Integrating blockchain technology with an existing product or 
service is one of the most likely ways to achieve mass adoption 
of blockchain at an early stage and to more quickly realize its 
procompetitive benefits.  
Second, regulators and policymakers should strive to 
resolve the tension that exists between the actions of securities 
and competition regulators. To date, the SEC has largely 
regulated the blockchain and cryptocurrency community 
through enforcement actions. An alternative approach is to 
implement rules and guidelines that take into account feedback 
from stakeholders. The clarity of rules over fact-specific 
enforcement actions would bring a degree of certainty that is 
currently missing from the market. Additionally, the SEC and 
the DOJ can use their MOU as a framework to better align their 
objectives as it relates to the future of blockchain platforms. 
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Lastly, policymakers should seek to clarify laws and regulatory 
mandates that give rise to the tension in the first place. 
VI.  Conclusion 
SEC enforcement actions are in tension with competition 
regulators’ procompetitive vision for blockchain-based 
platforms. These actions make it more difficult to solve the 
incentives problem that blockchain platforms face and steer 
companies toward a sponsor-led model via progressive 
decentralization, which competition regulators have challenged 
with increasing regularity. In addition to impeding the 
realization of decentralization objectives, the SEC’s 
enforcement actions complicate the use of existing ecosystems 
to spur adoption of blockchain technology that could otherwise 
increase competition. They also increase the likelihood that 
young blockchain companies may be acquired by firms 
incumbent to the industry that they intend to disrupt, which 
could reduce competition. Considering the consequences that 
SEC enforcement actions are having on the competitive 
dynamics of blockchain companies, regulators should carefully 
review how enforcement actions may affect blockchain 
companies, and how to resolve this tension moving forward. 
 
